Bio terrorism

Dr John Sloss


County Durham and Darlington NHS

Trust

Clinical Scenario (1)

- City of 1.2 million
- Several military establishments
- 28y/o female
- 2 days fever, malaise, fatigue
- Improved 2-3 days
- Presented to hospital with severe respiratory distress, dyspnoea, stridor, shocked and cyanosed

Clinical Scenario (2)



- Lobulated mediastinal widening parenchymal infiltration at left lung base
- Rapid deterioration and death

Clinical Scenario (3)

- At post mortem:
- Haemorrhagic thoracic lymphadenitis
- Haemorrhagic meningitis



Microbiology (Blood Culture)



- Gram positive Rods seen shortly after death.
- Tacky granular bees eye colonies non haemolytic on blood agar.

How would we cope?

- Recognition
- Diagnosis
- Involvement of Central Government
- Communication
- Stockpiling of consumables
- Protection of Initial responders
- Decontamination

District General Hospital

- Prior contingency planning (Management, Clinicians, Laboratory, and Infection Control Team)
- Briefing of ALL staff at an appropriate level
- Command and Control
- Realisation of limitations in diagnosis, treatment (ITU)


United Kingdom Assets


HPA, CDSC, CPHL

CAMR PCR, ELISA, Culture confirmation


Health and Safety Executive Decontamination

UK Sources of Information






Further sources





Sverdlovsk Incident 1979



- 96 Human Cases
- 68 Deaths
- Plume affected humans up to 4km and animals up to 50km
- Incubation period up to 43 days
- < 1gm released</p>

Washington 2001





The USA anthrax incident October 2001

- 5 Anthrax letters
- 18 cases
- 11 inhalational cases (5 deaths)
- Immediate prophylaxis with ciprofloxacin effective
- Extensive contamination of postal system
- 3 cases not connected with the mail

Anthrax as a Bio terrorism agent



- Disease of herbivores
- Gram positive rod
- Hardy spores
- Easy to grow
- Easily aerosolized
- Mortality 65% to 85%
- No person/person spread
- Persists in the environment

Post exposure prophylaxis of Anthrax

Within 24 hours

Ciprofloxacin
Doxycycline
Amoxycillin (If Pregnant)

60 days not vaccinated 30 days vaccinated

Inhalational Anthrax




Cutaneous Anthrax





Intestinal Anthrax

Cecal Lesion from eating undercooked Carabao... (AFIP)



Management of Anthrax

Antibiotics (60 days for inhalation)

Ciprofloxacin, Penicillin (if susceptible), Doxycycline. Note resistant to cephalosporins.

Supportive care

Only EARLY treatment improves prognosis
Universal Infection Control precautions

Smallpox

- Prodrome 1-3 days
 Acute onset with fever headache prostration
 Erythematous rash day
 2
- Maculopapular rash day 4 to 6
- Vesicular centrifugal rash day 8 to 14




Smallpox as a bio terrorist agent

- Easy to grow
- Low infective dose
- Incubation period make transmission difficult to control
- Dramatic and demoralising effect
- Massive social disruption

Diagnosis of Smallpox

- Clinical Recognition
- Category 4 hazard but 3 following first case
- Blood Viral culture, PCR, Antigen detection
- Vesicle fluid EM, PCR, culture
- Scab as above

Smallpox Vaccination



Index Case



- Aged 2 years
- Fever, misery, centrifugal rash
- Multiple skin lesions at the same stage of evolution affecting palms and soles

Vaccinated contact



Vaccinated day of contact

Minimal illness

Seven macules only

Her husband



- Not vaccinated
- Severe headache and fever for 2 days
- Generalized erythematous rash
- No time for vesicles to develop
- Died 12 hours later

Current resources

Vaccines being stockpiled

Specialist Teams

Training

Laboratory Support

Smallpox management

- Transfer to Infectious diseases unit using full respiratory and contact isolation
- Use immune staff to treat
- Vaccinate all contacts within 16 days (ring vaccination strategy)
- ?VZIG for high risk contacts

Potential agents category A

- Anthrax
- Plague
- Smallpox
- Tularaemia
- Viral haemorrhagic fever
- Botulinum toxin

- Easily disseminated or transmitted
- High mortality
- Public panic
- Require a degree of Public Health preparedness

Potential agents Group B

- Q fever
- Brucellosis
- Meloidosis
- VEE
- Enteric Pathogens
- Other toxins


- Moderately easy to produce and disseminate
- Have moderate morbidity and mortality
- Require enhanced diagnostic and surveillance capacity

Potential agents category C

- Nipah Virus
- Hantah Virus
- Tick borneHaemorrhagic fever
- Tick borne encephalitis
- Yellow fever
- MDRTB

- Emerging agents
- Easy to produce and disseminate
- High morbidity and mortality

The attractions of Bio terrorism



- Cheap
- Simple to produce
- Defence is difficult

Devastating effect

Lethality Number of fatal doses per 5 ml of agent


Cyanide 50

Nerve gas 5000

Botulinum Toxin 1,000,000

Anthrax 50,000,000

Worse case scenario



- 50kg of agent in an urban area of 5 million population
- Anthrax 250,000 cases (100,000 deaths)
- Plague 150,000 cases (36,000 deaths)
- Tularaemia 250,000 cases (19,000 deaths)

Decontamination



- Main priority
- Hospital will need?armed sentries
- Manpower
- Facilities
- Staff decontamination
- Eating/Drinking


How real is the threat

• Who knows?

 However mass production storage and dissemination is technically not easy

Most likely use would be as a local disruptive act


Panic



Information Plan

- Staff briefing
- Availability of expertise

How ready are you (we)?



- Awareness
- Surveillance
- Planning

Stockpiles

Training

Protective Equipment

Vaccination

Don,t Panic

Coping with victims (Mass deaths)